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Abstract—Public community Mobile Ad Hoc NETworks
(MANETs), such as the “Funkfeuer” or “Freifunk” networks,
scale up to several hundreds of routers, connecting users with
each other, and with the Internet. As MANETs are typically
operated over wireless channels (e.g. WiFi), access to these
networks is granted to anyone in the radio range of another
router in the MANET, and running the same MANET routing
protocol. In order to protect the stability of the networks
from malicious intruders, it is important to ensure that only
trusted peers are admitted to participate in the control message
exchange, and to provide means for logically “disconnecting” a
non-trustworthy peer.
This paper presents the concept of admittance control for the
Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2),
and suggests a security extension based on digital signatures.
Due to the flexible message format of OLSRv2, this extension
keeps compatibility with the core OLSRv2 specification. Several
standard digital signature algorithms (RSA, DSA, ECDSA), as
well as HMAC, are compared in terms of message overhead and
CPU time for generating and processing signatures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network integrity in routed networks is largely preserved by
physically controlling access to the communications channel
between routers: know thy peers, trust thy peers — and be
able to disconnect thy peers if they are not worthy of the trust,
e.g. if the topology they present does not match expectations.
Routing integrity is thus protected by admitting only trusted
peers, assuming that these, once admitted, are well behaving.
In a MANET (Mobile Ad hoc NETwork), often operated
over wireless interfaces, this is less obvious: physical access
to the media between routers is not delimited by a cable, but
is available to anyone within transmission range; the network
topology is time-varying, either due to router mobility or due
to time-varying characteristics of the channel – consequently,
determining that a peer does not present an “expected topol-
ogy” and subsequently “disconnecting” it is difficult. As such,
MANETs do not introduce particularly new security issues
for routing protocols, but rather render existing security issues
easier to exploit and, therefore, require re-examining counter-
measures for routing protocol resilience.
A. OLSRv2 Overview
The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 [1],
[2], [3], [4], [5] is the successor of the widely used OLSR [6]
routing protocol for MANETs. A proactive link state protocol,
OLSRv2 retains the same basic algorithms as its predecessor,
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Figure 1. Basic OLSRv2 Operation
but offers various improvements, e.g. a modular and flexible
architecture allowing extensions to be developed as add-ons
to the basic protocol.
OLSRv2 contains three basic processes: Neighborhood
Discovery, Link State Advertisement and MPR Flooding.
Neighbor Discovery and Link State Advertisement manifest
themselves through HELLO and TC messages, generated
periodically. HELLOs and TCs, both, advertise links between
the router generating the message and (a subset of) its
neighbors – possibly also indicating additional information
pertaining to each such link. HELLOs are used for detecting
bi-directionality of links, and list all neighbors, each associated
with a status flag (HEARD, SYM). HELLOs are exchanged
only with direct neighbors. TCs are used for sharing link-state
information network-wide, and list only neighbors with which
a symmetric link has been identified (by the Neighborhood
Discovery process). TCs include a sequence number, used to
allow recipients to exclude outdated information, incremented
when the set of advertised links changes. TCs are delivered
through the network using MPR Flooding.
MPR flooding is a process for each router to efficiently
perform network-wide broadcasts. Each router designates, a
subset (MPR set) from among the neighbors with which a
bi-directional link has been identified, such that a message
transmitted by the router and relayed by the MPR set is
received by all its 2-hop neighbors. MPR selection is signaled
by a router by associating a flag (MPR) to the selected
neighbors in outgoing HELLOs. The set of routers having
selected a given router as MPR is the MPR-selector-set of
that router. A study of the MPR flooding algorithm can be
found in [7].
MPR selection further serves to allow designation of which
links are to be included in TC messages: a router must (at
least) include links to all its MPR-selector-set. Thus, the
schematic operation of OLSRv2 is illustrated in figure 1.
B. OLSRv2 Security Problem Statement
Correct operation of OLSRv2 assumes that each router
is able to acquire a consistent topology map, reflecting the
effective network topology. In OLSRv2, this implies that: (i)
the links designated by HELLOs to be advertised in TCs reflect
actual links in the network; (ii) that the TCs advertise these
actual links; and (iii) that TCs are correctly relayed, i.e. that
the MPR flooding process operates correctly.
In figure 1, router a selects b as MPR in order to cover c. b,
therefore, advertises the link b-a in TCs. If a, in its HELLOs,
“pretends to be” (spoofs the identity of) d, then b will instead
advertise the link b-d. If b spoofs the identity of d when gen-
erating TCs, the link d-a is advertised. As neither b-d nor d-a
exist in the network, this will cause incorrect topology maps in
routers – with potential consequences including routing loops,
parts of the network being disconnected or traffic to the same
destination from different parts of the network terminating in
different routers [8]. If a malicious router, X (gray circle) is a
neighbor of a and spoofs the identity of c (more generally, of
all neighbors of b), then a will not select b as MPR. This has
as consequences that (i) b will not advertise b-a; and (ii) the
MPR flooding process is disrupted: TCs transiting through a
will not be relayed by b to reach the right-hand side of the
network.
Symmetric attacks exist by instead of spoofing the identity
of itself, a router spoofs the identity of its neighbors – i.e
spoofs links in the network: e.g., if b sends TCs advertising a
link b-d without having a neighbor spoofing the identity of d,
this will have similar effects.
C. Paper Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: sec-
tion II presents the general idea of “admittance control” in
OLSRv2, allowing a router to employ cryptographic signatures
to detect, and take proper actions, against identity spoofing.
Section III expresses this in terms of an extension to OLSRv2,
and section IV studies the performance of an OLSRv2 network
when using this extension and with various cryptographic
algorithms. [9] states “The energy cost of transmitting 1Kb a
distance of 100 meters is approximately 3 joules. By contrast,
a general-purpose processor with 100MIPS/W power could
efficiency execute 3 million instructions for the same amount
of energy”, indicating that shorter (but more computationally
intensive) signatures for certain applications, such as energy
constrained devices, may be preferential. This paper , there-
fore, in place of the usual network performance metrics (over-
head, bandwidth, ...) studies per-message processing overhead,
both for when generating and receiving messages. The paper
is concluded in section V.
II. ADMITTANCE CONTROL
The objective in this paper is to provide a mechanism,
akin to that which is employed in “classic” routed networks
as described in I: a way of ensuring that only trusted peers
are admitted to participate in the control message exchange
between routers – and, thus, also a way for a router to logically
“disconnect” a non-trustworthy peer. Absent the ability to
physically control access to the channel between routers, the
mechanism employs logical “admittance control” by including
cryptographic signatures in control messages (HELLO and
TCs), and requires their verification prior to accepting a control
message for processing or forwarding.
Verification of a cryptographic signature, associated with
a control message, allows the recipient to assert that (i) the
control message has not been altered while in transit and
(ii) the originator of the control message is in possession of
a cryptographic key for generating a valid signature. Con-
cerning (ii), a cryptographic algorithm employing symmetric
shared keys supports simple discrimination between “trusted”
and “untrusted” routers. Employing asymmetric keys enables
discrimination between individual trusted routers, thus pro-
hibiting a “trusted router” from spoofing the identity of another
router (trusted or not) in the network.
Associating signatures with control messages is not without
effect on network performance: generation and verification of
signatures incurs a computational overhead in each router, and
inclusion of signatures in control messages increase the num-
ber of bits to transmit over the wireless interface. These effects
are, for a selection of cryptographic algorithms, quantified in
this paper .
A. Resilience Evaluation
The admittance control mechanism enables routers to deter-
mine if a received control message originates from a “trusted
router”, discarding information received from non-trusted
routers. This leaves two remaining vulnerabilities uncovered:
(i) recording control traffic from a “trusted router” for later
replaying (possibly elsewhere in the network) and (ii) trusted
routers misbehaving, e.g. by spoofing links.
For (i), a countermeasure in the form of synchronized time-
stamps can be employed, included in each control message;
for (ii), inclusion of signatures for both ends of an advertised
link can be considered. Synchronized time-stamps and per-link
signatures are, however, the subject for a subsequent article.
III. SPECIFICATION
Introducing admittance control to OLSRv2 requires spec-
ification of (i) a way of associating signatures to control
messages and (ii) the necessary processing for generating
and verifying signatures (and, appropriate actions to take in
case verification fails). Compared to its predecessor, OLSRv2
facilitates this through the use of [2] as packet and message
format, and through explicit ”hooks” in [4], [5] for recognizing
external reasons for rejecting a message as malformed.
A. Signature TLV Structure
[2] enables a generic way for protocol extensions to add
information to control messages by way of inclusion Type-
Length-Value (TLV) objects. Thus, a security extension can
associate a signature to a HELLO or TC by including a
“Signature TLV” in the control message:
<sign-tlv> := <hash-fkt><sign_algo><sign>
where: <hash-fkt> and <sign_algo> identify the choice
of hash function and signature algorithm, respectively, and
<sign> contains the digital signature, calculated thus:
sign = sign_algo(hash-fkt(message))
Verification of a message is a boolean operation, acting as a
black-box for the routing protocol and returning true if the
message signature verifies, false otherwise:
verified = verif(message, <sign-tlv>)
B. Message Generation and Processing
As enabled by [4], [5], subsequent to the usual HELLO
and TC generation, outgoing messages are signed and a
<sign-tlv> included. Upon receipt of a HELLO or TC,
a message is identified as malformed and, thus, not processed,
if verif(...) for that message returns false. For TC
messages, per-hop mutable fields (hop-count and hop-limit)
are set to 0 for calculating <sign> and verif(...).
Note that due to the packet and message format of OL-
SRv2 [2], using this signature extension keeps compatibility
with the “core” OLSRv2 specification. A router, that uses
OLSRv2 without the extension, does not know the TLV type
and will consequently ignore the information contained in
these TLVs. It it thus able to correctly process signed control
messages, however, its HELLOs and TCs will be rejected by
all routers applying the security extension, since the messages
are not signed.
IV. PERFORMANCE STUDY
Introduction of signatures provides a measure of “admit-
tance control” to OLSRv2 – at the expense of increased control
message sizes and per-message-generation/processing over-
head, dependent on the cryptographic algorithms employed.
This additional overhead is quantified by way of NS2 simula-
tions, using with a selection of cryptographic algorithms: RSA-
1024, DSA-1024 and ECDSA-160. The signature-lengths in
these algorithms have been chosen so as to provide similar
resilience against attacks, with an 80-bit security level [10].
RSA [11], DSA [12] and ECDSA [13] employ asymmetric
keys, i.e. permit by verification of the signature to also verify
the identity of the router generating the message. For compari-
son, the symmetric HMAC-801[14] algorithm is also included.
The results presented in this section are all normalized wrt.
OLSRv2, i.e. only the additional overhead incurring from the
security extension is depicted.
Simulations have been conducted using JOLSRv2 [15] using
relatively standard scenario parameters (1km2 square, 100m
segments of random walk at 2-8ms , 0-5s pause-time and 5
concurrent CBR streams of 3.2kb/s). The number of routers
was varied between 10 and 50, and each value has been
averaged over 15 simulation runs.
1Note that HMAC, strictly speaking, is not a signature algorithm, but
a Message Authentication Code. As such, it does not offer per-principal
authentication nor non-repudiation. In the rest of the paper , we will not make
this distinction and will abusively refer to HMAC as a signature method.
Crypto Generation time Processing time Overhead
ECDSA-160 2.11 ms 3.73 ms 42 bytes
DSA-1024 2.78 ms 5.26 ms 46.31 bytes
RSA-1024 4.84 ms 0.33 ms 128 bytes
HMAC-80 0.07 ms 0.04 ms 20 bytes
Table I
SIMULATION RESULTS: PER-MESSAGE GENERATION/ PROCESSING TIME
AND OVERHEAD
In addition to the additional control traffic overhead, the
in-router message generation/processing overhead has also
been measured. JOLSRv2 uses AgentJ [16] for interfacing
with NS2. AgentJ/NS2 permits a single thread execution at
a time, without preemption, thereby allowing instrumenting
the signature generation and verification code to record the
time spent on each such operation2. For the simulations, an
Intel Core 2 CPU with 2.1 GHz and 4 GB of RAM was used.
A. Simulation Results
Table I summarizes the average measured time for generat-
ing and processing control messages, as well as the average
overhead, incurred by each of the four signature processes. For
OLSRv2 without signatures, these values would all be zero.
As a first observation, HMAC-80 requires significantly less
time than ECDSA, DSA and RSA for generating a message
signature. For verification of a message signature, HMAC
likewise spends substantially less time than ECDSA and DSA,
whereas RSA is close to HMAC in the time it requires for a
verification. Verification of RSA signatures is faster than both
ECDSA and DSA, however with much greater overhead as
well. These figures are hardly surprising; the characteristics
of the various signature algorithms are well-known [12].
Figure 2 depicts the cumulative time each router spends,
over the duration of 100 seconds, on generating message
signatures in JOLSRv2. As the number of routers grow in
the network, so does the time each router spends in total on
generating signatures. The reason for this is, that OLSRv2
enables “triggered message generation”, i.e. that message
generation may result from some external event, in addition to
periodical messages. Thus, with more routers being present in
the network, more links are detected as appearing/disappearing
– and therefore more messages, and corresponding signatures,
are generated.
The corresponding cumulative processing time in each
router is depicted in figure 3. Each router generates HELLOs,
which must be processed by its neighbors. Thus, increasing
the network density increases the number of HELLOs that a
given router receives and, therefore, the number of signatures
to verify. Depending on the network topology and MPR
selection, additional routers may also incur additional TCs,
whose processing and signature verification is to be conducted
by each other router in the network. Finally, as indicated
above, triggered messages as more links appear/disappear in
the network also cause more messages with signatures to
verify.
2For completeness: AgentJ rewrites System.currentTimeMillis()
such as to return the “simulator time”, whereas System.nanoTime() is
not rewritten and therefore returns the “wall clock time”.
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 10  20  30  40  50
m
s
Number of routers
ECDSA-160
DSA-1024
RSA-1024
HMAC-80
Figure 2. Cumulative time per router spent on generating message signatures.
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Figure 3. Cumulative time per router spent on verifying message signatures.
A couple of general observations can be made concerning
the results. While HMAC and RSA do not need a significant
amount of time for signature verification, ECDSA routers
spend almost 8% of their time verifying signatures, while DSA
spends more than 10%. This might still appear reasonable
– but it has to be kept in mind that the simulation was
performed on relatively fast hardware3, whereas devices in an
OLSRv2 network may be far less powerful than that, such as
smartphones or even sensors. Thus, one might be tempted to
use RSA signatures if CPU ressources is the primary concern
and ECDSA otherwise. That said, ECDSA scales better than
RSA (e.g., increasing from 80-bit security level to 128-bit level
will lengthen ECDSA keys by about 40% and RSA keys by
200%), which should be taken into account when elevating
the security level.
Figure 4 depicts the cumulative overhead in the network,
due to the inclusion of message signatures. Intuitively, as the
per-message overhead is constant, the cumulative overhead
would be a function of the number of control messages – itself
a function of simulation time and number of routers. That the
curves in figure 4 grow slightly faster than linearly with the
number of routers is, as stated previously, due to triggered
messages.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a general extension to OLSRv2
for providing “admittance control” in an OLSRv2 network: en-
abling admitting “trusted routers” and excluding “non-trusted”
3Albeit using the less than optimal Java multi-precision arithmetic.
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Figure 4. Total overhead incurring due to signature inclusion.
routers from participating in the control message exchange
between routers, thereby providing a mode-of-operation of an
OLSRv2 network, similar to that which is otherwise employed
for preserving network integrity in routed networks.
A performance study of this extension is presented, quanti-
fying the impact in terms of increased control traffic overhead
and increased per-message generation and processing time.
The signature algorithms used were RSA-1024, DSA-1024 and
ECDSA-160 – chosen and parameterized in order to provide
for comparable resilience.
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